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WHAT HAS PHILOSOPHY TO SAY TO RELIGION? 
Peter Winch 
(edited by D.Z. Phillips) 
Does philosophy determine what is sense or nonsense, or does that distinc-
tion get its sense from the practices in which it appears7 Does religion com-
pete with philosophy in giving an account of reality? Prometheus Bound illu-
minates one conception of the relation of the divine to the human condition, 
one of compassion rather than power. The same distinction can be found in 
conflicting conceptions of justice. The conflict cannot be resolved by an 
appeal to human nature, but one can reject the general claim that justice must 
be based on a balance of power. The religious perspective may be said to be 
informed by "a place outside the world", but the sense of this notion is reli-
gious, and does not involve the illusion of a metaphysical place beyond all 
our practices. Philosophy may remove misunderstandings about these prac-
tices, but it cannot demonstrate or refute their validity. 
Editorial Note: The present paper is a combination of two papers by Peter 
Winch. 'What has philosophy to say to religion?' was read at Montana State 
University on May 18th 1989. 'The love of the gods' was a brief paper, in response 
to a colleague's presentation, read at the University of Illinois at Urbana -
Champaign on March 7th 1988. J have edited the response to make it self-con-
tained. It is the second section of the present paper. The papers are part of the 
Peter Winch Archive at University of Wales Swansea. 
The influence of Wittgenstein, throughout Winch's discussions, led me to 
include them in this special issue on religion and TNittgenstein's legacy. The divi-
sions in the paper and their titles are mine. Any insertions by me are indicated in 
square brackets. Combining the papers affords a discussion of (a) the relation of 
philosophy to other forms of human thinking; (b) the elucidation of a relation of the 
divine to the world very different from that which dominates contemporanj philos-
ophy of religion; (c) the relation of philosophy to these different conceptions of the 
divine. 
J 
Philosophy and Forms of Human Thinking 
JJ A philosopher easily gets into the position of an incompetent manager 
who, instead of getting on with his own work and just keeping an eye on 
his employees to make sure that they do their work properly, takes over 
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their work until one day he finds himself overloaded with other people's 
work, while his employees look on and criticize him".' 
That is a quotation from a notebook of Wittgenstein's written in 1931. It 
hits off nicely the characteristically ambivalent relationship between phi-
losophyand other forms of human thinking, while at the same time raising 
the question of how we are to determine what precisely is the philoso-
pher's "own work". 
It is well known, notorious perhaps, that philosophers regard it as an 
important part of their task to assess the intellectual significance of other 
forms of human thinking: moral, aesthetic, political, scientific thinking, for 
example: and religious. The way they carry out this task will reveal the 
view they take of the distinction between sense and nonsense: whether they 
think the criteria for this distinction as independently discoverable by philo-
sophical reasoning: or whether they think of such criteria as fashioned in 
the different practices of the modes of thinking they are investigating. The 
danger of the first approach is that noticed in the quotation from 
Wittgenstein: the danger of trying to do other people's work rather than 
one's own. The danger of the second approach is that of an "anything 
goes" attitude: a type of relativism which places everything on the same 
level. Distinguishing the worthwhile from the meretricious is a responsibil-
ity philosophy surely cannot relinquish without violating its own nature. 
However, perhaps it is misleading to put the issue, as I have been doing, 
as though it concerned the observance of boundary lines between one" dis-
cipline" and another. Disputes about this are no doubt important in the 
context of academic politics, but hardly matter if what we are interested in 
is basic intellectual integrity and clarity. What does it matter, it may be 
asked, to what discipline a given inquiry and its outcome belong, provided 
the inquiry is honestly and intelligently conducted and its conclusion well 
established? - I have a great deal of sympathy with this attitude. 
However, there is still a serious point that I have not yet properly 
expressed. So I will try again. 
In my view the most valuable contribution to our intellectual culture of 
the philosophical tradition (cultivated most explicitly in logic and episte-
mology) is sensitivity to, and techniques of clarifying, differences between 
different uses of language and the kind of argument and criticism appro-
priate to each. This interest is one important reason why philosophers 
have concerned themselves with investigating the logical and conceptual 
character of the diverse forms which inquiry, thinking, argument and 
inference take in different areas of human concern. It is also probably the 
most important reason why philosophical inquiry is so persistently and 
narcissistically turned on its own nature and significance.' 
There is another central, and perhaps more primitive, stream in our 
philosophical tradition: I mean the ("metaphysical") attempt to give a gen-
eral account of the nature of existence and, in particular, of mankind's 
place within it. I think it is probably true to say, indeed, that the cultiva-
tion of the kind of logical sensitivity to different modes of utterance that I 
was talking about a moment ago, has been developed most fully and fruit-
fully by way of reaction to the perceived intellectual excesses to which 
metaphysics, in this sense, is constantly tempted.3 
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This brings me at last to religion. I spoke of the metaphysical attempt to 
formulate "a general account of the nature of existence and, in particular, 
of mankind's place within it". But could not this phrase equally well char-
acterize what we seem to find, say, in the first two Chapters of Genesis, to 
say nothing of other sacred texts, both Christian and non-Christian. Are 
philosophy and religion, then, competitors in the same line of business? It 
is certainly a common perception that this is so. Undergraduates frequent-
ly come to philosophy seeking enlightenment on such subjects as "the 
nature of reality" and "the meaning of life", and there is no doubt that 
often, initially at least, they do hope to find in philosophy what, for one 
reason or another, they have failed to find in religion. 
Certainly there is a great deal of error and confusion in such expecta-
tions. But the confusion is a perfectly natural one and the conceptual fea-
tures that give rise to it are far from easy to set in a clear light. I do not of 
course expect to achieve that in the course of one short [paper]: but it is the 
subject I shall try to discuss. 
So far I have been speaking in very general terms and I want now to 
become more specific. I am going to consider an idea put forward by 
Simone Weil about the relation of the world to God, namely, that we 
should think of the world, not as created by an exercise of God's infinite 
power, but rather as existing precisely because God refrains from exercising 
His power to its full extent, since the full exercise of His power would 
make no room for the possibility of anything existing but God. 
The idea is not original to her; though the way she develops it is. [In the 
next section I shall simply elucidate the idea, in my own way, by reference 
to Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, and then, in the following section, turn to 
Simone Weil's development of the idea.] The reason why I find this a par-
ticularly interesting example in relation to my theme is this: The "God" 
Simone Weil speaks of here is undoubtedly the God of Christianity, the 
God of worship and prayer, rather than the "God of the philosophers" (as 
found in Descartes's Meditations or in Leibruz's Discourse on Metaphysics, for 
example). That is to say, it is undoubtedly a religious conception that she is 
developing. But it is also closely connected with her treatment of logical 
and epistemological issues in certain earlier works: Indeed, it sometimes 
looks as though generallogico - conceptual considerations are advanced as 
part of the argument for her view. This makes her thinking about this a 
particular difficult case for someone who, like myself, let me reveal, thinks 
that religious meditation and philosophical argument cannot properly be 
assessed according to the same standards. [But this serves to raise the 
issue of the relation of philosophy to religion: "Are they competitors in the 
same line of business?".] 
IT 
On the Love of the Gods 
Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound is about the love of gods for human beings 
and about the implications of this love. The nature of 'the divine view of 
things', is very much an issue in the play. The play, whether or not this 
was an issue for Aeschylus himself, raises not merely a question about 
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what view the gods take of human beings and of the world; but a question 
which I incline to regard as deeper: what kind of thing are we saying when 
we talk about a view of the world taken by the gods? We are speaking in 
an entirely different mode here from that involved in speaking of, say, the 
different views of the world taken by Colonel JaIl and the Magistrate in 
J.M. Coetzee's novel Waiting for the Barbarians. 
The comparison would attach insufficient importance to the fact that 
Prometheus and Zeus are gods. Zeus differs from the rulers of Coetzee's 
Empire not in the extent of his power, but in the nature of that power. This 
would not make it wrong to compare Coetzee's and Aeschylus' works; nor 
even to think it wrong to see their themes as linked: to see Waiting for the 
Barbarians as a book about the relation of humankind to the gods. But it is 
important to the treatment of the theme that the gods do not figure at all as 
protagonists in the action of the novel, but are the main focus of attention 
in the play. There are important conceptual (" grammatical") differences 
between speaking of human beings inflicting suffering on each other (the 
Empire on the barbarians, Joll on the magistrate), and speaking of a god's 
inflicting suffering on a human being (Zeus on 10); and further conceptual 
differences in speaking of one god inflicting suffering on another (Zeus on 
Prometheus ). 
The last point especially is bound up with complications about the iden-
tity of divine figures. There are countless stories about one god defying the 
explicit command of another god while in fact doing the other god's secret 
will. One of the best known examples is to be found in Wagner's Der Ring 
des Nibelungen in which Briinnhilde, Wotan's daughter (and hence an ema-
nation of his love) disobeys her father's command by protecting Siegmund 
(another off-spring of Wotan) and is punished for it by Wotan (in a scene, 
incidentally, which seems to me musically one of the purest expressions of 
love in the cycle, perhaps in all Wagner's work); punished for it, even 
though it is quite clear that Wotan actually wants Siegmund to be protect-
ed. Wotan, however, the chief of the gods, is unable to protect Siegmund 
because of the implications of his divinity: a general concern for humanity 
(of which he is brutally reminded by the goddess Fricka) in such matters as 
the keeping of contracts. 
There are distinct echoes of a similar theme in Christian theology: in the 
role of God the Father in imposing the Passion and Crucifixion on his son 
(limy beloved son, in whom I am welJ pleased"). If "inlposing the crucifix-
ion on his son" sounds too strong, remember Christ's plea to have the cup 
taken from him and the Father's response, or lack of it. 
What these stories bring out, of course, is the idea of a conflict, an essen-
tial conflict, in the nature of the divine: a conflict involved in the very idea 
of humanity as the object of divine love. I think, then, that it is best to 
regard Prometheus Bound, not as a story about the relations between various 
individuals, named respectively Zeus, Prometheus (who happen to be 
Gods) and 10 (who happens to be a mortal woman), but as concerning, on 
the one hand, the relation between different aspects of divinity, (represent-
ed by Zeus and Prometheus) and, on the other hand, the relation between 
divinity in its different aspects (Zeus and Prometheus) and humanity (10). 
Putting the matter like this shows how such complexities in the notion 
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of identity, as applied to a god, are intimately connected with deep concep-
tual issues about how we are to read stories about the gods: about what, to 
use a different idiom, is their logica 1 and conceptual status. 
I shall take it for granted that the sense of stories about the gods makes 
no room for the notion of a possible verification of them analogous., e.g. to 
the ways in which stories about what goes on behind the scenes in the 
White House might "in principle" be verified.s I shall also take it for grant-
ed that these stories are not merely told for their entertainment value 
(though that is of course, sometimes, a significant element), but are ,intend-
ed to convey important insights about the nahlre of human life, about "the 
human condition". 
These two assumptions taken together suggest (to put the claim at its 
weakest) that we must seek the religious value of such stories about gods 
which want to make the notion of love central to our understanding of life 
and of the world. Central, I mean, not just in the values we apply in our 
understanding of different possibilities in the attitudes human beings may 
have to one another, but in our understanding of the nature of creation at 
large and, in particular, in our understanding of the place of human beings 
in creation, or vis-a-vis the rest of creation. These issues are far from being 
mutually independent, as is brought out in the beautiful passage from St. 
John's Epistle (1,4:20): "If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he 
is a liar: for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he 
love God whom he hath not seen?". The passage also, incidentally, brings 
out the close conceptual connection between God's love for mankind and 
mankind's love for God. Another way of putting this would be to say that 
stories about the gods belong to an attempt to represent the world as a 
place human beings are, or at least can be, at home in, feel they belong to. 
The very fact that such a question can be raised already shows something 
about the character of human beings and of their place in the world. What 
gives these stories their point is that there is much about the world which 
makes it very difficult for us to regard it as a place we can be at home in, 
given the undoubted miseries of many different sorts that life involves. 
Prometheus Bound, I take it, attempts to represent these miseries as a natur-
al, perhaps necessary, concomitant of that in human life which also shows it 
to be a product of divine love. An amazing task to undertake, you may well 
think: one, nevertheless, that it has in common with many other such stories. 
And this can be nothing less than everything that we regard as characteristic 
of human existence, the practice of cultivating the environment, husbandry, 
the taming of animals, the building of homes, the arts, the various forms of 
inquiry, the ability to plan for future contingencies, the complex modalities 
of love in human relationships, and so on: In short, all those gifts that 
Prometheus bestowed on humankind and the absence of which Hobbes' 
Leviathan represents as what makes natural human existence "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short". I will try in a moment to address - very briefly and 
sketchily - the nature of the connection between these gifts and the concomi-
tant suffering, both human and divine, which mark it off from the sort of his-
toricizing theodicy where the suffering of the present is to be made 'mean-
ingful' by the rosy revolutionary dawn that will some day come. 
In putting the matter in the way I have, I deliberately want to discour-
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age the question "why". Prometheus loved humanity. The very asking of 
the question displays, in my view, a misunderstanding of Prometheus' 
divine status. By the same token it misunderstands the possible relation to 
divine love of what is valuable in human life. These values are a manifes-
tation of, not a reason for, divine love. One could not avoid circularity in 
taking the latter course: since one would need to refer to those very fea-
tures which are a divine gift, as the reason why the gift was bestowed. 
Prometheus did not see a potential in human beings the gods missed. He 
bestowed this potential on humanity. 10 has no special features which 
explain Prometheus' love. The lack of a 'reason' helps to characterize the 
love. 10, however, is as it were, essentially an exemplary recipient of divine 
love. The confrontation with 10 is part (perhaps the central part) of 
Prometheus' torment, keeping before him the implications of what he has 
done. She is his 'thematic twin', but not in the sense of being a fellow vic-
tim of torture; she is, rather, a fellow victim of divine love; their juxtaposi-
tion displays the different consequence of such love for a god and for a 
human being. 10 shows what sacrifice by the gods amounts to and what it 
means for humanity. (I think we have to read Zeus' love of 10 and 
Prometheus' love of humanity as different aspects of the relation of 
humanity to divine love.) 
Let me go back to my promise to say more about the connection 
between divine love for humanity and divine and human suffering. The 
first point to notice is this, beautifully expressed by Wittgenstein: "The 
human gaze has a power of conferring value on things; but it makes them 
cost more toO".6 The life that goes with the cultivation of the land, the 
search for understanding, the existence of stable family and other social 
relationships, is a life with tremendous potentialities but equally, and by 
the same token, a life inevitably involving agonizing disappointments and 
suffering of all sorts. 
The fact that this is so 'by the same token' perhaps gives a hint why the 
gifts of the gods (in the persons of both Prometheus and Zeus) entail suffer-
ing for them (in the person of 10). And let us not forget the Chorus who are 
not exactly bubbling over with joy either. All these manifestations of 
human civilization involve the application of standards and of ideals of per-
fection which cannot, in human life, ever be realized. Their realization can 
only be a divine realization. What is more, the understanding of this fact 
emerges from, and only from, that very life in which perfect realization of 
the good is unattainable. But when the gods give these things to human 
beings they ensure that their own perfection is no longer fully realized in 
the world. That is why their gift is a gift of love and why it involves suffer-
ing in the very nature of being, in the nature, that is, of the gods themselves. 
It is the helpless suffering of knowing one has sacrificed the possibility of 
complete perfection. Human suffering, on the other hand, is the sort inflict-
ed by the gadfly: the restless search for a perfection that is unattainable. 
I by no means want to underestimate in any way the role of physical 
pain and suffering in all this; but the importance of the emphasis on torhlre 
is the added dimension of suffering involved when the pain is deliberately 
inflicted by one human being on another. Coetzee, it seems to me, brings 
this out beautifully. The terrible hardships of the environment described 
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on the Magistrate's expedition from the barbarian frontier are almost a 
relief from the cruelties of Jail. This added dimension, moreover, is made 
possible, precisely by the kind of life together that Prometheus' gifts make 
possible. I wonder if this is part of the meaning of la's serni-transfiguration 
into a beast, a cow, in her attempt to flee Zeus' love. She sees the suffering 
that love involves and tries to escape it by rejecting its gifts. Only, of 
course, once the nature of the gift has been comprehended, it is too late, for 
such comprehension comes only with those gifts. The eventual salvation 
which Prometheus prophesies for her is an acceptance of the gifts: Zeus' 
impregnation "without fear", an acceptance that is to say, of the gifts along 
with their cost. Whereas, on the contrary, any historicist hope that all may 
one day be made well (the cost eliminated), when the revolution comes 
perhaps, is just a continuation of the original refusal to accept the gods' 
gifts, their costs being an inextricable part of the package; it takes one far-
ther from the possibility of salvation and reconciliation with Zeus. 
The historicist hope plays down the importance of the individual in 
favor of humanity 'collectively'. It will be felt by some that la's healing will 
change almost nothing, and that this is why she is so deeply ambivalent 
about the prospect of Zeus' touch "that brings no fear". I would say, on the 
contrary, that it is just because that touch will change everything that she is 
so ambivalent about it. When I say' it will change everything', I have in 
mind something like what I believe Wittgenstein meant when he wrote: 
If good or bad willing changes the world, it can only change the 
limits of the world, not the facts, not the things that can be expressed 
in language. 
In brief, the world must thereby become quite another. It must so 
to speak wax or wane as a whole. 
The world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy 
(Tractatus 6:43). 
Fear of this change is precisely one of the main elements in lo's relation 
to the gods. The historicist may reply that whereas everything is changed, 
it is only for her, the implication being that it would be of no great signifi-
cance. One may react in the same way to the actions of the Magistrate in 
Coetzee's novel, if one concentrates on the collectivity. His commitment to 
decency may seem admirable, it may be argued, but he can do nothing for 
the wider cause of decency. 
I find such reactions astonishing. The point of acting decently is not to 
do something 'for decency', it is simply - to act decently. Of course if one 
can do anything to create a situation in which people are more likely to act 
decently, so much the better. But if one cannot do that - and usually one 
will not be able to - that does not remove the point of one's own decency. 
Indeed, to see this, really to see it and to live by it, is, so it seems to me, a 
large part of accepting Zeus' impregnation without fear; and I even see 
something of this in the Magistrate, who seems to me anything but an 
image of moral futility. My moral disagreement with an emphasis on the 
collectivity in the reading of Prometheus Bound is inseparable from philo-
sophical and theological disagreemenF [Such disagreement is explored 
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further in the next section in relation to the work of Simone Weil]. 
III 
Justice, Power and Epistemology 
Simone Weil distinguishes between two forms of justice: a higher and a 
lower. The lower form is that which applies exclusively to bargaining situ-
ations between parties roughly equal in power. She does not mention 
Hume, but this is clearly the conception of justice that he had in mind. 
Distinct from this is a conception of justice as what she calls "a supernatur-
al virtue". Her account of this starts off from a passage in Thucydides' 
Peloponnesian War which greatly impressed her. It concerns the embassy of 
the Athenians to the island of Melos, the purpose of which was to bully the 
Melians into joining the Athenian alliance against Sparta (of which Melos 
was a former colony). The Athenians rest their case on (to speak anachro-
nistically) the Humen concept of justice.8 
And we ask you on your side not to imagine that you will influence 
us by saying that you, though a colony of Sparta, have not joined 
Sparta in the war, or that you have never done us any harm. Instead 
we recommend that you should try to get what is possible for you to 
get, taking into account what we both really do think: since you 
know as well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by 
practical people, the standard of justice depends on the equality of 
power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the 
power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept. 
A bit later: 
So far as the favor of the gods is concerned, we think we have as 
much right to that as you have. Our aims and our actions are perfect-
ly consistent with the beliefs men hold about the gods and the princi-
ples which govern their conduct. Our opinion of the gods and our 
knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and neces-
sary law of nature to rule wherever one can. This is not a law that we 
made ourselves, nor were we the first to act upon it when it was 
made. We found it already in existence, and we shall leave it to exist 
forever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in 
accordance with it and we know that you or anybody else with the 
same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way. And 
therefore, as far as the gods are concerned, we see no reason why we 
should fear to be at a disadvantage. 
When the Melians refused the Athenians' demands they were attacked 
and defeated: all adult males were slaughtered, women and children 
enslaved. 
Simone Weil makes the important comment" that in spite of (or perhaps 
because of) the candour with which the Athenians state their case, their 
manner of presentation shows that they did not in fact believe their view of 
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things to be the only possible one: "we see in Thucydides how clearly the 
Athenians, when they perpetrated cruel abuses of power, were aware that 
they were doing so". 
Just as the Athenians linked their claims to a certain conception of the 
Gods, so does Simone Weil believe that the existence of this unacknowl-
edged other possibility shows something about the relation of the world to 
God. 
The Athenian idea that "it is a general and necessary law of nature to 
rule wherever one can", is expressed by Simone Weil herself in another 
way/o where she refers to our constant unthinking practice of using other 
people in the service of our own interests and "do not waste our time and 
power of attention in examining whether they have consented to this". She 
comments: "This is necessary. If it were otherwise things would not get 
done, and if things did not get done, we would perish". That is as much as 
to say that the necessity of exercising power in the way described by the 
Athenians is rooted in the nature of human life. 
If this thought is connected with certain very important epistemological 
discussions in her earlier work we can see that it cuts very deep. In those 
discussions she had argued against a traditional empiricist account of the 
human formation of concepts by any sort of process of abstraction from or 
construction out of a given manifold of sensation: and for an account 
which makes human practice primitive and sees concepts as essentially 
embedded in practice. Practice in its tum has to be seen as an expression of 
the nature of the acting individual, which it aims to preserve and enhance. 
Hence the perception of the world by human beings is itself, and necessari-
ly, an aspect of practical activity, the exercise of power, in which the per-
ceivers' interests are expressed. A world of objects with stable properties in 
determinate, discernable causal relations, a world in which an agent's goals 
can be rationally pursued and obstacles to the attainment of those goals 
methodically investigated. 
This is the deeper source of the temptation to which the Athenians suc-
cumb in thinking that the very fabric of the world is structured on the prin-
ciple that "one must rule wherever one can"Y Simone Wei I sees the same 
line of thinking manifested in the emphasis in what has been perhaps the 
dominant Judaeo-Christian theological tradition on God's power and of 
His creation as an expression of that power. It is a line of thinking which 
can take one, as it took the Athenians, to the position that a sufficiently 
worthy project can justify an exercise of power without limit, to the posi-
tion indeed that there is no intelligible alternative to thisY 
In her later writings one of Simone Weil's principal concerns was to 
refute this position and show that something else is thinkable. Her great, 
and well-known, essay on The Iliad is an example. She also points to the 
example of Christ and, in particular, to St. Jolm's words about him: 
"Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with 
God: But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a 
servant, and was made in the likeness of man: And being formed in fash-
ion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even 
the death of the cross. Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him and 
given him a name which is above every other name". 
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She comments: "These words could have been an answer to the 
Athenian murderers of Melos", and links this "answer" with the following 
remark: "The act of Creation is not an act of power. It is an abdication. 
Through this act a kingdom was established other than the kingdom of 
God. The reality of this world is constituted by the mechanism of matter 
and the autonomy of rational creatures. It is a kingdom from which God 
has withdrawn". 
The production of examples (like that of The Iliad and St John's Epistle) 
cannot, I take it, show that the Athenians were wrong in the way they 
behaved on Melos. What it can do is to challenge their claim that their way 
of thinking about such matters is the only possible one and is shared by all 
mankind. Such a mode of argument (challenge by counter-example) is of 
course well known in philosophy, where I believe it fulfils a legitimate and 
important function. But obviously this is not all that is going on. The exis-
tence of this new possibility is linked on the one hand with a religious con-
ception of the world in relation to God: on the other hand with a philosoph-
ical analysis of the genesis of our concept of a natural order of the world. 
Simone Weil's reference to "the mechanism of matter and the autonomy 
of rational creatures" clearly makes this latter connection. She offers in 
various places arguments to show that our understanding of the nature of 
things develops in our methodical attempts to overcome obstacles to our 
projects. It is natural to conclude as a corollary that only by pressing our 
powers of action to their limits shall we be able to form an adequate con-
ception of the necessities of nature. It is interesting that in our own time 
opposition to such a view has been mounted from within the scientific com-
munity itself. This is clearest, perhaps, in the contemporary emphasis on 
respect for ecological equilibrium not merely as a politico-moral ideal but 
as a condition for proper understanding of the natural environment and of 
the place of human beings within it.1Cl But similar considerations are at 
work too in many of the debates about the limits to the role of experimen-
tation on human beings and animals. 
Be that as it may, it is certainly Simone Weil's mature view that respect 
for such limits on the exercise of power is a condition for proper under-
standing of the natural order. She argues, for instance, that the idea of an 
equilibrium in nature is possible only for one who is willing to inhibit his 
natural tendency to appropriate, use and consume. (Her discussions of the 
beauty of the natural order are extremely important in this respect). And 
again she argues that an understanding of the rational autonomy of human 
beings is possible only in a context in which that autonomy is respected: i.e. 
in which other human beings are recognized as imposing limits on accept-
able pursuit of our projects. 
This, if it can be sustained is an answer to the Athenians' claim (like that 
of Plato's Thrasymachus) that they, and they alone, in their conversations 
with the Melians, are thinking and acting "in accordance with nature". For 
ill fact, they are not merely opposing the conception of justice appealed to 
by the Melians, they are characterizing it as an illusion. It is an attempt by 
the weak to defend themselves against the strong, but there is no reason 
whatever for the strong to take it seriously. 
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It is as though the Melians are saying: "You can't treat innocent people 
like that"; and as though the Athenians were replying: "Can't we : just 
watch!". And as though they thought this response were not merely the 
sick joke it in fact is, but a genuine logical rebuttal. They claim that the 
Melian use of "cannot" has no sense; it is nothing more than a rhetorical 
fa~on de parler, not expressive of any genuine impossibility. And do they 
not show, by their subsequent actions that indeed there is no such impossi-
bility as the Melians allege? 
I have put the matter in a way with which I think many contemporary 
philosophers would agree. Their agreement is an expression of the idea (to 
which "theories of meaning" are a monument) that language cannot be 
allowed to look after itself: that it is not enough to point to the fact that we 
do as a matter of fact speak in a certain way; our way of speaking, our 
grammar, have to be justified, it has to be shown that they correspond to 
something real. Many - perhaps most - philosophical attempts either to 
refute or provide rational grounds for religious belief are an apphcation of 
this idea. The Thrasymachian idea that there is a justice that is "natural", 
and that any use of the word which does not correspond to this nature 
expresses a mere illusion, is another application. 
IV 
Philosophical Rebuttals 
There are two ways of rebutting the [Athenian] position which are radi-
cally distinct, but easy to confuse. One is to try to replace one apologetic 
metaphysics with another: to argue, for instance, that nahlre is other than 
what the Athenians claim. The other (as I think, the sounder one) is to 
argue that our attitudes and practices - religious for instance - do not have 
that sort of relation to nature and hence cannot be either rejected or sup-
ported on such grounds. 
The second, anti-metaphysical, conception is the one really required by 
Simone Weil's account of concept formation (of concepts as expressive of 
our practices). What is confusing is the way in which her philosophical 
arguments tend to be conflated with the articulation of a distinctive reli-
gious outlook. 
Consider the following striking remarks from an important passage in 
one of her last notebooks: 14 
"The Gospel contains a conception of human life, not a theology. If I 
light an electric torch at night out of doors I don't judge its power by look-
ing at the bulb, but by seeing how many objects it lights up. The bright-
ness of a source of light is appreciated by the illumination it projects upon 
non-luminous objects. The value of a religious or, more generally, a spiri-
tual way of life is appreciated by the amount of illumination thrown upon 
the things of this world. Earthly things are the criterion of spiritual things. 
This is what we generally don't want to recognize, because we are fright-
ened of a criterion .............................................. if a man gives bread to a beg-
gar in a certain way or speaks in a certain way about a defeated army, I 
know his thoughts have been outside this world and sat with Christ along-
side the Father who is in Heaven. If a man describes to me at the same time 
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two opposite sides of a mountain, I know that his position is somewhat 
higher than the summit. It is impossible to love at the same time both the 
victors and the vanquished, as The Iliad does, except from the place, outside 
the world, where God's wisdom dwells".'5 
On the one hand talk of a "place outside the world, where God's wis-
dom dwells" or where we can sit "with Christ alongside the Father" may 
seem to imply some religious metaphysics, or theology, which explains the 
possibility of such phenomena as the understanding and love expressed in 
The Iliad, or the non-Christian Roman senator who quite gratuitously gave 
his life to save his Christian slave (another of her examples). If what she 
says is construed in that light, as a piece of philosophico - religious meta-
physics, it seems positively to invite Spinozistic criticisms of any such 
phrase as "a place outside the world". 
My reference to Spinoza at this point is quite deliberate: Simone Well 
had studied him deeply and was even influenced a good deal by him in 
certain aspects of her thinking. It is not at all likely that she was unmindful 
of the force of his insistence that "a place outside the world" is no place at 
all. Furthermore the remark earlier in the section seem clearly to rule out 
such an interpretation and to imply on the contrary that the sense of such 
apparently metaphysical talk is to be seen only in those (earthly) phenome-
na which are a "criterion" of the spiritual. 
To say that the value of such a life as Christ's or of a view of human con-
flict like that of Thr Tliad or of the Roman senator's sacrifice of himself for 
his slave, is apparent only from a place outside the world, is to say that 
there is nothing in the world to justify us in attributing value to it, which is 
to say that there is nothing (period) to justify it, which is to say that it is 
without justification. However, if we express it like that, what has become 
of the supposed answer to Thrasymachus, or to the Athenians at Melos? It 
looks as though we are now just agreeing with them. "As far as the gods 
are concerned, we see no reason why we should fear to be at a disadvan-
tage", is what the Athenians said: i.e. there is nothing in the nature of 
things to justify a view contrary to ours. And am I not now interpreting 
Simone Weil as saying much the same thing? As saying, as I may now 
express it, that philosophy can provide no justification for viewing the 
world in a way opposed to the Athenians' way? 
The answer to these questions is yes. But that does not mean that the 
preceding argument has led us nowhere. One thing it shows is that the 
Athenians are by no means entitled to claim that philosophy is on their 
side rather than on the side of the Melians. Philosophy is not on anybody's 
side. [In Wittgenstein's phrase], "It leaves everything where it is". If there 
is no justification for the conception of justice the Melians appeal to, there 
is equally no justification for that of the Athenians. The Athenians may be 
right to claim that it is a fact of life that most people most of the time think 
as they do. But it is equally a fact of life that The Iliad was written, that 
Christ lived, that the Roman senator (like countless others) sacrificed him-
self for another when there was no argument to drmonstrate that he should; 
and so on. And moreover, and I think this is very important, it is also a 
fact of life that people who contemplate, or hear about, such actions (we for 
instance) tend to be struck by them in a certain way, with a sort of awe. 
428 Faith find Philosophy 
Few people would find themselves admiring the Athenians: and those 
who did might well be ashamed of themselves for so doing.16 Admittedly 
there is no justification for this. But it is a tendency as rooted in human 
nature as is the tendency expressed by the Athenians. Indeed as Simone 
Weil noted, the way in which Thucydides has the Athenian ambassadors 
express themselves, betrays how "when they perpetrated cruel abuses of 
power, (they) were aware of doing SO".17 
I have left one of the threads of my discussion conspicuously dangling. 
If the religious imagery in expressions like "his thought has been outside 
this world and sat with Christ alongside the Father who is in Heaven" or 
"the place, outside the world, where God's wisdom dwells" is not to be 
construed metaphysically, what is its function? Are we not simply left 
with certain attitudes to the world and towards human behaviour which 
can be expressed less misleadingly in other terms and which, indeed, there 
will be no need to characterize as "religious"? With regard to the second 
part of that question: It does seem to me, I must confess, natural to charac-
terize such attitudes as religious attitudes, whether or not these quasi-theo-
logical expressions play any major part in their expression. But I am not 
going to argue about that; and it seems to me relatively unimportant 
whether or not one uses the label "religious" as long as one recognizes 
them clearly for what they are." But I do want to say something about the 
suggestion in the first part of the question that such explicitly religious 
forms of expression serve no useful purpose and only mislead. 
Fortunately for me perhaps, J do not however have much [space] left to say 
anything very substantial about this. 
Let me take: "It is impossible to understand and love at the same time 
both the victors and the vanquished, as The Iliad does, except from the 
place, outside the world, where God's wisdom dwells". I want to compare 
this expression with what is said in geometry: that two parallel lines meet 
"at infinity". Correspondingly to Simone Weil's characterizing this "place" 
as "outside the world" one might say that the phrase "at infinity" in this 
context does not designate a position in space. And one might argue, in a 
way parallel to that in which I argued about the religious example, that 
since it is possible for lines to meet only at a place, and since infinity is not 
a place, to say of lines that they meet at infinity is simply a way of saying 
that they do not meet. And, (if we leave the "simply" out of account), that 
is perfectly true. Somebody not versed in geometry may be inclined to 
think that if what is meant is that parallel lines do not meet, it would be 
better to say that and not to talk so misleadingly. One could show such a 
person the point of the expression only by pointing out its use and fertility 
within geometry, the constructions, proofs and theorems that would be 
impossible without it. Another way of putting this would be to say that 
the sense of the phrase is not derived from the phenomenon of parallel lines 
to which it is applied, but lies in the geometrical uses to which it is put. 
Thinking of parallel lines as meeting at infinity makes these uses possible: 
but it would be quite misleading to say that it "justifies" them: as though 
there could be a discovery that it is not after all the case that parallels meet 
at infinity and that, therefore, all those constructions and proofs that 
depend on that conception are invalidated! It would be more accurate to 
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say that the problematic conception is itself "justified" by the construc-
tions, etc. it makes possible. 
It is an analogous way that the author of The Iliad, say, can be said to 
occupy a perspective of "supernatural justice" which is "outside the 
world", or that it is the perspective of "the wisdom of God the Father". 
The point of speaking like this can be seen only by attending to its use 
within the practices of religion, to other contexts in which similar expres-
sions are used, to the relations between it and other forms of religious 
expression, to the ways in which these expressions serve to articulate reli-
gious practices and attitudes, to the ways in which one's understanding of 
things is different, when expressed in such terms. It does not have any 
independent status which qualifies it to justify all these ways of speaking, 
thinking and acting. 
These religious practices, and the attitudes which go with them, stand 
or fall with the appeal they are or are not able to make to human sensibili-
ty. Philosophy may attempt to remove misunderstandings about their 
nature. But it can neither demonstrate nor refute their validity. 
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1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value Oxford: Blackwell 1980, p.16e. 
2. It is no new discovery that the logical character of an utterance cannot 
always infallibly be read off from its superficial linguistic form. Though I 
believe that the realization of the extent of the potentiality for being misled 
here is something which has been developed in philosophy in the [twentieth] 
century as perhaps never before. 
3. Kant's Critical Philosophy is one of the most obvious examples. One of 
the most interesting aspects of the work of Wittgenstein, or so it seems to me, is 
the way in which his unprecedentedly fastidious and persistently critical atti-
tude towards the metaphysical "craving for generality" begins itself to take on 
the appearance of a powerful vision of human life of a sort that it is tempting to 
call "metaphysical" - though I think it best to resist this temptation. 
4. E.g. Lectures on Philosophy, Oppression and Liberty, Notebooks. 
S. There is a hilarious lampooning of what is involved in such a verificato-
ry conception in O.K. Bouwsma's Without Proof or Evidence, in the form of an 
anecdote about a wandering Greek who inadvertently stumbles on a meeting 
of Zeus and his subordinate divinities on Olympus. 
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, p.le. 
7. One central aspect of such disagreements can be pursued by comparing 
Winch's discussion of the gods with that of Bernard Williams in Shame and 
Necessity and that of Martha Nussbaum in 'Transcending Humanity' in Love's 
Knowledge (Ed.). 
8. Book V. Chapter 7. 
9. In 'The Great Beast', Selected Essays, p.llS. 
10. 'Are We Struggling for Justice?' trans. Marina Barabas, Philosophical 
Investigations. 
11. I realize of course that I am here compressing a complicated argument 
in a way that can hardly be convincing or even intelligible. That is the price I 
must pay for the foolhardiness of trying to discuss such an enormous topic in 
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the course of a single lecture. [For a detailed discussion see Winch, Simone Weil: 
The Just Balance c.U.P. 1989 (Ed.)] 
12. The parallels with certain modem utilitarian philosophies hardly need 
to be pointed out. 
13. I was for instance very interested to see Stephen Jay Gould reported as 
calling Jane Goodall's ecologically conscientious study of chimpanzee commu-
nities the most important contribution to biological science of recent times; and 
I think he meant: precisely in virtue of its ecological conscientiousness. I am 
afraid that 1 cannot report this accurately. 
14. First and Last Notebooks, pp.l46-8. 
15. This last remark is best seen as (using Wittgenstein's phrase) "the deter-
mination of a concept". 
16. I was struck by the following reaction, so reminiscent of Alcibiades, of 
an accountancy student at Brooklyn College to Plato's Corgias: "Gee, that guy 
Socrates. First of all when you read him you think you agree with him. Then a 
bit later you think: Hell no, that's not what I think! And then that guy Socrates 
makes you feel a jerk". 
17. The same sort of ambivalence is of course brilliantly exploited by Plato 
in his account of the arguments between Socrates and people like 
Thrasymachus, Glaucon, Gorgias, Polus and Callicles. This is not the place to 
discuss this, but I think Plato clearly did think that Socrates' interlocutors could 
be refuted by philosophical argument; in the sense that Socrates' own view of 
things could actually be established. Of course I am doubting this. 
18. I do as a matter of fact suspect that reluctance to use the term itself aris-
es partly from confusions about the relation between religion and metaphysics. 
But 1 am not going to attempt to argue that either. 
